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Media freedom is crucial for good governance but what leads to free media? Does the
ideology of media outlets tend to make media outlets independent from the influence of the
incumbent party? In the political economy of media literature, the ideology of media outlets
are usually seen as a negative factor for media freedom. Using a formal model, this paper
demonstrates that the ideology of media outlets can rather promote media freedom by acting
as a safeguard against media capture by the government. In the model, I label media outlets as
adversarial and non-adversarial ones, and demonstrate that the media capture becomes harder
as the proportion of adversarial media outlets in a country increase. I also show that the
media capture becomes less likely as the level of opposition by the adversarial media outlets
increases. Case studies from Turkey and Peru support the implications of the model.
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ÖZET
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Medya özgürlüğü iyi bir yönetim için gereklidir, o halde medya özgürlüğünü belirleyen
faktörler nelerdir? Medya kuruluşlarının kendi ideolojilerinin olması onları yönetimdeki par-
tinin olası etkisinden bağımsız kılar mı? Medya üzerine yazılmış siyasal ekonomi literatürü
medya kuruluşlarının kendi ideolojilerinin olmasını medya özgürlüğü açısından olumsuz bir
etki olarak değerlendirir. Bu çalışma, bir model yardımıyla, medya kuruluşlarının kendi
ideolojileri olmasının, onları yönetimdeki partinin etkisinden bağımsız kılabilecek bir etken
olarak, medya özgürlüğünü pozitif yönde etkileyebileceğini göstermektedir. Modelde, medya
kuruluşları ideolojik olarak hükümet karşıtı olanlar ve diğerleri olarak ikiye ayrılırlar. Sonuçta
hükümetin ideolojik karşıtı olan medya kuruluşlarının medya içindeki oranı arttığında, me-
dyanın yönetimdeki parti tarafından tamamen ele geçirilmesinin zorlaştığı gözlenir. Türkiye
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Free media facilitates the functioning of a democratic political system by providing the
information flow from government to the public. Free media promotes social and economic
development by promoting good governance. Today, some countries incorporate free media
while governments in others tend to silence media through bribing or repressing. What de-
termines this variation across countries? This paper aims to contribute to the growing body
of literature regarding the determinants of media freedom by modeling media freedom as an
output of a game between media, the incumbent party and voters. As a result, I find that ide-
ology of media outlets and the strength of this ideology determine the scope of media freedom
by affecting the likelihood of media capture.
This paper, using a formal model, presents the ideology of media outlets as a determinant
for media freedom in countries where media is ideologically polarized. I will argue that si-
lencing media, i.e. media capture, becomes a harder task for the incumbent party when the
media outlets in a country are ideologically diverse and have strong ideologies. I will test the
implications of the model with case studies from Turkey and Peru.
What motivates this study is the crucial role independent media plays for the functioning
of democracy. This paper, like the majority of political economy papers written on media,
assumes that mass media provides the information that people use in elections in democratic
regimes. In other words, widespread information is crucial for democracy since it allows
voters to know about whether the incumbent party exploits its political power. Thus, media
matters for people’s voting decisions.
A corrupt incumbent may abuse its power and use it to transfer state resources to the
1
privileged few at the expense of many. When media does its job well, voters may punish the
corrupt incumbent by not voting for it in the upcoming election. Voters, at a large scale, can
reach to this information about a corrupt incumbent mostly through the media. Media plays
a crucial role in spreading the information about the corruption.
This paper relate to the two pillars of the political economy literature on media freedom:
media capture andmedia bias. Media capture occurs when the government manages to silence
media outlets in order to prevent them from providing information to the voters. In this paper,
not being captured by the government is a criterion for free media. Media bias, on the other
hand, is defined as misreporting of news in favor of the interests of state or private actors.
Media capture may cause bias in the media coverage. Similarly, an ideological position taken
by a media outlet may also cause media bias since this media outlet will tend to alter its
coverage depending on its ideology.
In the literature, both media capture and media bias are seen as detrimental factors that
spoil media freedom. I argue in this paper that ideologically biased media can rather act as
a positive factor that may enhance media freedom by inhibiting media capture. On the one
hand, an ideological media outlet may alter its news coverage in order to serve private or
political interests as mentioned above. This negatively affects media freedom. On the other
hand, ideology may have a positive effect on media freedom, too. Biased media is harder to
silence through capture when this media outlet ideologically opposes the incumbent. Because
this media outlet may have less incentives to accept any material benefit coming from the
government in return of suppressing the information about corruption.
In order to demonstrate the positive role that the ideology plays, this paper uses a formal
model by building on an existing media capture model of Besley and Prat (2006). Besley and
Prat, in their paper, introduce media as a player to the existing political agency games in the
literature (a la Robert Barro 1973; John A. Ferejohn 1986). This political agency literature
talks about the role of information on the reelection of politicians. In a world which consist of
an increasing number of states with democratic institutions and popularly elected politicians,
media plays a crucial role for the flow of information. This relationship between the politician,
media and the voters consists a part of the election process. Besley and Prat (2006) paper
innovates political agency models by providing voters with information endogenously by the
media outlets. Their model discusses how and when government captures media. The model
reveals that independence ofmedia can be ensuredwhen the number of privately ownedmedia
outlets and the commercialization in the media market increase. Nevertheless the issue of
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ideology is left out in their media capture model. In this paper, I will extend Besley and Prat
(2006) model by adding an ideology dimension to it. In the model, I will discuss the role
of ideology on media capture when media outlets ideologically oppose the incumbent. The
model demonstrates that as proportion of adversarial media outlets increase, silencing media
becomes harder.
In the next section, I will introduce definitions and key concepts. The rest of the essay will
be organized as follows: in Chapter 2, I will go through the literature building on the main
assumptions of the model. I will introduce the model in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will include
case studies from Turkey and Peru respectively.
1.1 Definitions and Key Concepts
In this paper, I restrict the definition of media freedom to the print and broadcast media’s
ability to deliver news about activities of the government including the corrupt ones. If people
in a country are able to reach information about anything including corruption through main-
stream media, one can argue that media freedom is extant in this country. For the purposes
of this research, I focus only on the end result while defining media freedom: Whether the
government attempts to silence media using methods including bribing, censoring, harassing
or arresting journalists or not is not subject to the definition of media freedom. I only focus
on the question whether media can facilitate transparency and provide necessary information
to the public about the activities of the government?
Ideology of media outlets, which is introduced as a determinant for media freedom, is
defined as the ideological deviations of media outlets from the government. Are media outlets
ideological proponents or opponents of the government? Do they have the same ideological
positionwith the government or are they against it? Media outlets may oppose the government
in different ideological dimensions. As the media market include more outlets that oppose the
incumbent party ideologically in any dimension; we expect polarization and diversity in the
media market; and this polarization and diversity serve to a greater media freedom as they
help to inhibit media capture.
Assuming that media outlets may possess ideologies, the question arises: what kind of
an ideology they may have? Anti-government stance of a media outlets is not endogenous to
the model. In other words, media outlets do not become ideological outlets because they are
tried to be captured by the government. Some universal or country specific cleavages may
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create initial differences among people, and thus initial ideological proxies for media outlets.
These dominant and politically salient cleavage structures in countries may provide the space
for ideological polarization: For instance center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, or the division
between Republicans and Democrats in the US. Media outlets may oppose the government
in different ideological dimensions if there are more than one dominant cleavage structure in
the country.
Political ideology concept traditionally recalls the left-right cleavage. However the form
of this left-right distinction may take different forms in different countries. For instance,
in Turkey, the rivalry between the left and right is historically represented by the center-
periphery cleavage since the late-Ottoman period (Mardin 1973). Mardin (1973) refers to
the clash between the ruling elite and the rural masses as the divide between center and pe-
riphery. He defines center as the military and civil bureaucracy, while defining periphery as
the marginalized masses who failed to adapt the modernist ideology of the state. Politically,
this clash between center and periphery was represented in the rivalry between center-right
Democrat Party (DP) and center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) during the early years
of Turkish Republic. However, state bureaucracy and military do not represent the center
in modern Turkey anymore. As Kalaycioglu (1994) puts it, ”the center is no longer what it
used to be: Turkey lacks a coherent and compact elite group occupying the center and de-
fending collective interests of the center.” Although the center-periphery divide is stretched
and changed shape in time, the cleavage continues to dominate Turkish ideological sphere
in its contemporary form. Hale and Ozbudun (2009) argues that center-periphery distinction
is overlapped with the secular-Islamist cleavage in modern Turkey although they do not ex-
actly match. As Hale and Ozbudun puts it, governing Justice and Development Party (AKP)
of Turkey seems to be a representative of the peripheral values which defend the conserva-
tive and religious sectors of society that are marginalized or excluded by the secular center.
Therefore, an anti-government media outlet in Turkey could be representing the centrist val-
ues, which in time overlapped with secularism.
Nevertheless, an ideological clash between the incumbent party and a media outlet is not
necessarily limited to a single dimension. Different media outlets may oppose the incumbent
party from different ideological dimensions. For instance, Dogan Group in Turkey is an ide-
ological opponent to the governing AKP with its bias towards the centrist values, whereas
BirGun outlet is an opponent as a representative of the leftist ideology.
As I demonstrated with the example of Turkey, ideological stances of media outlets rep-
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resent dominant politically salient cleavage structures in their countries and these stances are
assumed not to be endogenous to the relationship between the media outlet and the incum-
bent party. Moreover, these ideological stances are not restricted to one dimension or not
restricted to traditional left-right division. Depending on the cleavage structures of countries,




2.1 Determinants of Media Freedom
There is a growing literature that attempts to understand the mechanics of media freedom
that I investigate in this paper. The empirical and theoretical literature focuses on factors such
as revenues and commercialization of the media market (Hamilton 2004, Besley and Prat
2006, Gehlbach and Sonin 2014, Petrova 2011), concentration of ownership in media outlets
(Corneo 2006, Djankov et al. 2008), existence of natural resources (Egorov et al. 2009), and
regime type (Stier 2015) as potential determinants of media freedom. One basic premise of
this literature is that politicians invest resources to capture the media and tilt news coverage
to prevent media from providing news about corruption to the voters. This paper follows
a similar approach and focus on government’s capture of media following other theoretical
papers such as Besley and Prat (2006) and Gehlbach and Sonin (2014).
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Besley and Prat (2006) presents one example of this theoretical media capture literature.
As mentioned in the previous part in detail, Besley and Prat (2006) introduce number of pri-
vately owned media outlets and commercialization in the media market as determinants of
media freedom. According to them, both factors impact media freedom in a positive direc-
tion. In other words, an increase in the number of privately-owned media outlets in a country
enhances media freedom by hindering media capture. Similarly, as media outlets start to
make more profits out of commercials, the level of media freedom increases because capture
becomes difficult. They do not leave any room for ideology in their paper.
Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) focus on two dimensions of media freedom: media bias and
media ownership. They define media bias as misreporting by the media only in favor of the
interests of the government. Later, they provide a formal model in order to demonstrate that
media bias is higher, or media is less free, when the state has a particular interest in mobilizing
citizens. In other words, they introduce the mobilizing character of the government as a deter-
minant for media freedom. Governments are more willing to mobilize when they need to take
actions for their own political objectives that are not in line with citizens’ best interests. They
also suggest that regime type, competition in the media market, and advertising revenues in
the media market are other factors that determine variations in media freedom. They expect to
see higher media freedom in polities with democratic regime types, and with higher competi-
tion and higher revenues in the media market. Unlike this paper, they do not count media slant
in favor of private interests, e.g. interests of media outlets, as media bias. Finally, authors
suggest that when capturing the media is too costly, the government can instead nationalize
it.
Di Tella and Franceschelli (2009) focus on the government transfers in the form of pub-
lic advertising in newspapers. Using data from Argentina between years 1998 and 2007,
the authors observe that as public advertising in a newspaper increases, the emphasize this
newspaper gives to corrupt activities of the government decreases. They measure how much
money each paper receives from government-related advertising and compare it to the amount
of first-page coverage devoted to corruption scandals.
Another branch focuses on ownership regime of media outlets. Djankov, McLiesh, Nen-
ova and Shleifer (2003) is one example. Djankov et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence
that state ownership of media decreases media freedom, since the capture of state-owned me-
dia is easier for those in power. Although they state that this pattern do not imply causality,
their argument is that press freedom decreases when the share of state in media ownership
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increases. They also show that state ownership is more common in ”countries that are poorer,
more autocratic, with lower levels of primary school enrollment, and with higher levels of
state intervention in the economy.”
Government is not the only actor that may attempt to capture media. Private interest
groups or even masses may capture media; and this eventually decreases media freedom.
Two examples of the theoretical literature on private capture are Corneo (2006) and Petrova
(2008). Corneo (2006) observes that capture of media by private interests is harder when
the ownership of a media outlet is shared by few large shareholders rather than many small
stakeholders. They define press freedom as the absence of media bias as a result of capture by
private interest groups. Petrova (2008) focuses on the role the rich plays in media freedom.
She argues that rich tries to influence media coverage to manipulate public opinion about tax
system and public projects. The author empirically shows that media freedom decreases as
inequality increases in a country because the likelihood that rich will try to alter news coverage
will increase with inequality.
In addition to the studies that focus on the source of the media capture, there is a large
body of literature on general determinants of media freedom. One branch of this literature
emphasize the role of commercialization in the media market. For instance, Hamilton (2004)
thinks that media freedom is a by-product of the emergence of daily newspapers as a commer-
cial product. He shows in his book that only 13% of US press was independent 1870. As the
market for newspapers grew, 47% of press became independent by 1900. Gentzkow, Glaeser,
and Goldin (2006) focus on the period from 1870 to 1920 whenmedia industry passed through
a major transformation in the US. During this period, media became independent rather than
being simple public relations for politicians. The authors argue that increased scale and com-
petitiveness in the media market gave rise to independent press in the US during this period.
Petrova (2011) also focuses on the same period that the independent media developed in the
US. In her 2011 study, ”Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an In-
dependent Press” Petrova argues that advertisement revenues, or profitability in the media
market bring freer media. She presents such evidence using data from American newspapers
in the 1880s. She adds that economic factors are not sufficient to explain media freedom,
incentives that politicians give to media outlets matter, too. Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009)
look from natural resources perspective in their article ”Why Resource-poor Dictators Al-
low Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data.” They show that resource-rich
countries with authoritarian governments have less free press compared to other authoritarian
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regimes. Their reasoning for this pattern is that authoritarian governments need bureaucrats
to improve quality of government whereas resource-rich dictators do not. To give incentives
to bureaucrats, resource-poor authoritarian governments allow for freer media.
2.2 The Role of Media on Political Behavior
The model on this paper is based on the idea that media has a significant effect on voting
behavior. One basic argument is that the media provides information to the public about the
activities of the incumbent party and the public decides whether to elect the incumbent for
the following term based on this information. One pillar of existing literature supports this
assumption. Several studies show that media has a significant effect on people’s voting be-
havior. For instance Enilokopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) demonstrate that access to
different TV channels in different regions of Russia affects the number of votes coming from
these regions for the governing party in 1999 parliamentary elections. Their study compares
regions of Russia which are heterogenous in terms of their ability to access to the only inde-
pendent television channel at the time. They observe that the aggregate vote for the incumbent
party systematically decreases in regions with an access to independent television. DellaVi-
gna and Kaplan (2007) is another study that estimate effects of media on voting behavior. In
this study, authors analyze the effects of the entrance of Fox News1 in the US media market
between 1996 and 2000. They observed that Republican candidate increased his vote share
in 2000 elections in 9,256 towns where Fox News had been in the market by year 2000.
A subset of literature on the role of media on political behavior focuses on voter turnout.
Gentzkow, Shapiro, Sinkinson (2011) show that newspapers increase political participation
using data on entries and exits of US daily newspapers from 1869 to 2004. They find that
an additional newspaper at state level increases both presidential and congressional turn out.
Nevertheless, they fail to find a significant relationship between the incumbent party’s reelec-
tion and newspaper coverage. Similarly, Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009) find using experi-
mental data that newspaper readership increased voter turnout in Virginia in 2006. Gentzkow
(2006) also study the effects of media on voter turnout and comes up with interesting results.
Using a cross-country dataset, he empirically shows that introduction of television reduces
voter turnout rates, while newspapers make a reverse effect on turn out.
Another branch of literature on the effect of media on political behavior focuses on politi-
1Fox News is known by its Republican bias in the US
8
cal knowledge. Delli Carpini andKeeter (1992) use survey evidence to show that self-reported
exposure to news in newspapers and radio is positively correlated with political knowledge.
Prat and Stromberg (2005) also support this relationship by using data from Sweden. In this
country, when people start to watch television political knowledge increases. Some other
laboratory studies such as Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992), and Norris and Sanders (2003)
also find that people learn from watching news. Finally, Analyzing data from the Ameri-
can National Election Studies 1984-2000, Snyder and Stromberg (2010) find that voters are
more informed about their representatives more in regions where newspapers cover news
about House of Representatives more. This is an evidence for the effect of media on political
knowledge.
Assuming media has a significant effect on voting behavior brings us to the following
premise: Politicians are expected to find ways to silence media to foster their positive cov-
erage on news as long as they can. Therefore the capture of media by politicians is a natural
result of media’s effect on voting decisions. This paper belonging to the literature on the
determinants of media freedom is also built on this premise.
2.3 The Role of Media in Reducing Corruption
This paper argues that media freedom acts as checks and balances on governments. The
public may punish corrupt governments once they reach to the information about corruption
through independent media outlets. Therefore, media freedom plays a central role in reducing
corruption. Political economy literature on the role ofmedia in shaping economic and political
outcomes supports this claim (Ahrend 2002, Adsera et al. 2003, Brunetti and Weder 2003,
Djankov et al. 2003, Chowdhury 2004, Besley and Prat 2006, Freille et al. 2007, Lindstedt
and Naurin 2010). For example, Besley and Prat (2006) explains that politicians are more
likely to engage in corrupt activities in the absence of media freedom due to moral hazard and
adverse selection. Moral hazard causes elected politicians to engage in corrupt activities when
they know that they are less likely to get caught (due to lack of media freedom). Similarly,
intrinsically bad politicians are less likely to be revealed in the absence of media freedom and
this effect is called adverse selection.
Brunetti andWeder look at the relationship betweenmedia freedom and corruption in their
2003 study. The authors argue that media freedom is a factor that curbs corruption since it
facilitates monitoring of politicians by the public. In order to test their claim, they design
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an empirical study using ordinary least squares and two-staged least squares regressions and
find that press freedom has a significant negative effect on corruption. The results are robust
for different model specifications and different measures of corruption and press freedom.
They use Freedom House’s press freedom index and ICRG2’s corruption index as respective
measures.
The empirical section of the Besley and Prat (2006) shows a mere correlation between
lack of media freedom and corruption after measuring corruption using ICRG￿s Corruption
Index just as Brunetti and Weder (2003) did. The novelty of this study is their measurement
of media freedom using different scales. Instead of using a media freedom index, the authors
look at two different variables: state ownership of newspapers and concentration in ownership
of newspapers. They assume low state ownership if state has less than 30 percent share in
the media market. They assume high concentration in ownership if top 5 media outlets own
more than 75 percent of the media market. They expect to see less corruption when media
companies are private and have less concentration in their ownership.
Adsera, Boix and Payne (2003) does not directly look at the effect of media freedom on
corruption. The authors are rather interested in a more comprehensive question: the impact
of political accountability on the quality of government. They measure media freedom with
”Free Circulation of Newspapers” while measuring quality of government with indices of
”Corruption”, ”Bureaucratic Quality”, and ”Rule of Law.” The strongest relationship they
found is between Circulation of Newspapers and Corruption. Regarding the main interest of
this essay, I will focus on this part of the study that is related to corruption and media freedom.
Adsera, Boix and Payne (2003)’s study finds a strong effect of free circulation of newspapers
on the level of corruption and the effect is robust for different model specifications. When
circulation of newspapers increases from its median value to its maximum, they expect to see
a 2.2 points
Ahrend (2002) looks at the effect of human capital and media freedom on corruption.
The study shows that higher levels of education is negatively associated with the level of
corruption only when media freedom is high. The model includes income, trade openness
and rule of law as control variables. The study employ Granger causality test in order to solve
for endogeneity problems. The economic model of Ahrend (2002) is much less rigorous than
Adsera et al. (2003). First of all, they include control variables which may be suspected
to be the outcome of dependent variable. For example, rule of law may be affected by the
2International Country Risk Guide
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levels of corruption. Secondly, Ahrend do not check robustness for different measurements
of corruption and media freedom. One final difference from Adsera, Boix and Payne (2003)
is that Ahrend (2002) uses education variables as explanatory variables whereas Adsera et al.
(2003) use them as instruments.
Nevertheless, the attempts of recent empirical literature to reveal a causal mechanism
is insufficient given the methods used. Why is there a negative association between media
freedom and corruption? Is there a third factor that effect both corruption and media free-
dom? What is the direction of this relationship? Is there a reverse causality problem? Is
media freedom exogenous to the empirical models? These questions have no explicit answer
since the field is dominated by cross-sectional OLS regressions. Only in a few specifications,
researchers attempt to use Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to reveal a possible causal
mechanism, although the instruments are weak.
Stanig (2015) is one of the studies that use Instrumental Variables approach. Stanig’s study
looks at the effect of repressive defamation legislation that restrict media freedom and finds
that corruption attracts significantly less attraction from the media in Mexican states where
defamation laws are more repressive. In other words, acts of corruption are more likely when
politicians can restrict media coverage by exploiting defamation legislation.
2.4 Ideology of Media Outlets
In this paper, I will assume that media outlets can have different ideologies. They can be
ideologically close to the incumbent or they can be ideological adversaries. This ideological
rivalry can take place in any dimension that is politically salient to the country. Ideological
position of a media outlet may alter the news coverage of this outlet and deteriorate media
freedom in country. But it may also enhance media freedom by making media capture by the
incumbent party more difficult.
As Prat and Strömberg (2013) summarizes, media bias may take four different forms. A
media outlet with issue bias select what issues it will cover. For instance, a captured media
outlet does not cover issues related to corrupt activities of the incumbent party. Facts bias
affect what aspects of issues a media outlet chooses to include or exclude. Framing bias
influence the way facts are presented and finally ideological stand bias determines how the
facts are commented. Therefore, media bias is usually seen as a negative factor that skews
elections and ultimately produces detrimental policy outcomes (Prat and Ströomberg 2013).
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Nevertheless, the biased media may enhance media freedom if this outlet is tried to be
captured by the government. Our model demonstrates that media’s capture by the government
gets harder when the proportion of ideologically opponent media outlets increases.
Arguing about the role of ideological media outlets in media outlets, one may question
whether it is plausible to assume media outlets have ideologies. The literature supports the
assumption that media outlets may have ideologies that lead to media bias as Prat and Ström-
berg (2013) explicitly states:
A media with a leftist label is more likely to have content with a pro-left electoral
impact, that is more likely to endorse left-wing politicians, cover issues owned
by the left, include facts positive for left-wing politicians and frame issues in a
way that benefits left-wing politicians. It is also more likely to use words and
phrases that attract left-wing consumers and that alienate right-wing consumers.
Additionally, Puglisi and Snyder (2008) find that when an outlet in the US has more
Democratic-leaning, that outlet tend to cover Republican scandals more than Democratic
scandals. In other words, Democratic papers tend to emphasize Republican scandals. Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2010) analyze how frequently partisan words and phrases appear in a sample of
newspapers in the US. They measure partisan words and phrases by looking at the similari-
ties between the words used by newspapers and congressmen. They conclude that newspapers
have partisan leanings.
The fact that media outlets may have ideological positions brings us to the question why
media outlets need to have these positions? The literature posits two different explanations for
this question: demand-side and supply-side stories (Prat and Strömberg 2013). On the supply
side, preferences of themedia outlet owners influence content. Profit maximizer media outlets
are willing to sacrifice profits for the sake of their political views or for larger long-term gains
from political connections. For instance, according to Baron (2006) a profit-maximizer firm
can tolerate ideologically biased journalists if only the firm is allowed to pay those journalists
less than others. Baron demonstrates a reverse relationship between ideological bias of a
newspaper and the sale price of this newspaper. Duggan and Martinelli (2011) also follows a
supply-side explanation. They argue that the position a media outlet takes is determined at the
editorial level and this editorial make-up is the choice of the manager or owner of the outlet.
Puglisi (2011) argues that New York Times included more democratic coverage during the
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presidential campaign because the owners of the newspaper wanted to influence the result of
the election in favor of Democrats.
On the demand-side, the explanation is derived from a psychological fact: confirmation
bias which says that people like to read news that correspond to their prior beliefs rather
than news that challenge their prior beliefs (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). Therefore,
media outlets become ideological ones because they target audience with certain ideological
preferences.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) follow demand-side explanations positing that low-quality
newspapers ignore signals contradicting the prior beliefs of their readers. In their 2010 study,
Gentzkow and Shapiro asks whether ideological preferences of newspapers are audience or
owner driven. They conclude that the ideology of owners plays a little role, as evidenced
by the fact that newspapers belonging to same company may have different ideological ori-
entations. According to the authors, the bias mainly depends on the ideological positions of
their audiences. Similarly, Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2008), show using a formal model
that left-wing readers like to read positive coverage of left-wing politicians and negative cov-
erage about right-wing politicians. Consequently, left-wing newspapers are more likely to
produce positive news about left-wing politicians, they argue. Using another model, George
and Woldfogel (2003) demonstrate that large groups can influence the content of media cov-
erage. According to Hamilton (2004), the content is determined by the target audiences of
large advertisers in countries where advertisement market is large.
Silencing media through bribing creates ideologically-biased media with a direction of
the bias towards the government. Media outlets give up their shorter term benefits from com-
mercial gains in return for larger gains from the government. So, the bias in non-adversarial
or pro-government media outlets can easily be explained with the help of a supply-side story
assuming that media outlets are profit maximizers.
Explaining the ideological bias in adversarial media outlets with a supply-side story as-
suming media outlets are profit maximizers is more difficult. On the demand side, however,
profit-maximizer outlets can choose to become adversarial to gain the target market consist-
ing of people who oppose the government. Therefore, explaining the ideology of adversarial





This paper will employ a formal model in order to examine the ideology of media outlets as
a determinant for media freedom. The model employed in this paper is an extension to an
existing model written by Besley and Prat (2006).
Following Besley and Prat (2006), this model combines elections with a game between
the media and the incumbent. The two-period retrospective voting model in this paper has
three groups of players: incumbent party, media and voters.
Incumbent party is the first player and it has two possible types, θ. The incumbent party
can either be a good type, g, or a bad type, b. The probability that a chosen incumbent party
is of a good type is γ. In other terms, θ ∈{b, g} with Pr(θ =g) = γ. Goodness of an incum-
bent party can be interpreted as honesty or lack of corruption. Badness can be interpreted as
stealing resources from voters.
Second group of players are media outlets whose role is to provide voters with the infor-
mation that they will need to make their voting decisions. As a result of news delivered by
media outlets, voters decide to vote for the incumbent party or not. TV stations or newspapers
can count as media outlets. There are n number of media outlets in the model. These media
outlets can prefer to be informative or not. Informative outlets deliver news and I assume that
only informative outlets are preferred by viewers. Viewers divide themselves equally among
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the media outlets that give informative news. Therefore each informative outlet gets an equal
share from the total potential audience-related benefits in the market. An informative outlet
gets am where a is the total potential audience related benefits in the market and m is the to-
tal number of informative outlets. If a media outlet is non-informative, its audience-related
revenue is 0. If there is only one informative media outlet in the market all revenues will be
received by it and all viewers will be informed.
Media outlets can observe that an incumbent is a bad type with probability q ∈ [0, 1]when
the incumbent is bad. We can interpret this probability as the quality of media. As the quality
of media increases, value of q gets closer to 1. Probability q can change depending on the
technological and cultural characteristics of a country. Institutional factors such as censorship,
harassment of journalists and the effectiveness of libel laws may also affect variances in q.
The n media outlets of a country are divided into two groups. The division is made based
on their ideological stance towards the incumbent party: whether they are adversaries of the
incumbent party or not. Adversarial media opposes the incumbent ideologically whereas the
non-adversarial media have no opponent views. β fraction of the media is adversarial whereas
the 1−β fraction is non-adversarial. I assume that the type of the media is exogenously given
for the sake of simplicity. Payoffs of all media outlets depend on audience related revenues
regardless of their types . Audience-related revenues come from commercial sources such as
sales, subscriptions, advertising.
Voters are the third group of players. They vote for the incumbent party if they believe that
the incumbent party is a good type. Benefit of voters from a good incumbent is 1, whereas
payoff of voters from a bad incumbent is 0. It is assumed that the voters do not observe their
payoffs before their voting decisions.
3.2 The Game
There are three implicit assumptions of the game. First, signals regarding the type of the
incumbent can only be bad. Second, media outlets can only print the verifiable information,
they cannot be fabricate news. In other words, they cannot say that an incumbent party is bad
when it is actually good. Third, all media have access to the same information. All media
outlets are at the same level of quality.
The incumbent can silence media outlets when they observe that the incumbent is bad.
15
This is modeled as a bargaining game between the media and the politician similar to Besley
and Prat (2006) paper. The incumbent can make an offer, ti and tj to two different types of
media outlets in order to silence them. We assume ti is the amount offered to the adversarial
media and tj is the amount offered to non-adversarial media. We assume that the incumbent
needs to pay more in order to buy adversarial media. If a media outlet accepts the offer, it
suppresses the signal that it received about the incumbent’s type. The transfer is assumed to
have a broad meaning for the incumbent. It can be interpreted as a loss of money, energy or
reputation.
A transfer ti,j , costs ti,j to the incumbent but yields ti,jτ to the media outlet. The parameter
τ ∈ [0,∞) is a transaction cost. The transaction cost can be interpreted as legislative con-
straints and the risk of judicial prosecution. It decreases the payoff the media outlet gets from
transfer.
For the adversarial media, there will be a disutility ω from the re-election of the incumbent
since it ideologically favors the opposition. If the incumbent is reelected, this amount ω will
be deduced from the total benefit of an adversarial media outlet. Therefore, for adversarial
media outlets the benefit from accepting the offer will be tiτ − ω.
The interpretation ofω can bemade in twoways depending on the type of opposition in the
adversarial media outlet. ω can be interpreted as a utility from the election of the opposition
party if the adversarial media outlet’s ideology is supply driven. Since the owners and the
employees of the outlet opposes the incumbent directly, the outlet gets a direct utility from
the election of the opposition party. However, this explanation does not workwhen the outlet’s
ideology is demand driven. If the ideology of an outlet is determined by the target audience in
the market, the outlet do not get a direct utility from the election of the opposition. In this case,
ω can be interpreted as an indirect utility that they get from revealing of the corruption. The
outlet gets an indirect utility when the opposition party is elected as a result of an corruption
coverage.
The payoff of the incumbent from reelection will be r. If the incumbent is reelected after
silencing the media, the payoff will be r−Σi∈Iti, and if it cannot be reelected the payoff will
be −Σi∈Iti.
The timing of the game is as follows:
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(i) The incumbent’s type θ ∈ {b, g} is realized. If θ = g, media observe no signal (s = ∅).
If θ = b, media observe s = b with probability q and s = 0 otherwise. The incumbent
observes the signal and decides to transfer ti,j ≥ 0, for each outlet i,j.
(ii) Media outlet observes the transfer and decides whether to accept or reject. If a non-
adversarial media accepts, it reports s = ∅ and receives tjτ . If it rejects, it reports the true
signal. The non-adversarial media behaves the same. If it accepts and the incumbent is
reelected it gets tiτ − ω, if it accepts but another media outlet rejects, it gets tiτ .
(iii) Voters observe the type of the incumbent reported by themedia. They decide to elect the
incumbent if the incumbent’s type is good, otherwise they elect the challenger whose
type is unknown.
The implicit assumptions in the timing of the game are the incumbent knows the signal
that the media received. The second assumption is that the incumbent makes its offer after
the signals are received by media. A third assumption will be that the offers are simultaneous
and private. This will be important for this model since adversarial type will be offered more
by the incumbent.
3.3 The Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the game has two components. The first is the bargaining game be-
tween the incumbent and the media. The bargaining game determines whether the media is
captured or independent. Media is captured when it accepts the transfer and suppress the
signal, it is independent otherwise. The second equilibrium is of the voting game.
The model equilibrium in the media market is determined by perfect Bayesian equilibrium
restricted to pure-strategy equilibria in which voters always vote for the preferred candidate.
The equilibrium conditions are as the following:
Proposition 1 Equilibrium in the media market may be one of two kinds
1. If n < rβτω+τa , the media is captured – non-adversarial media outlets accept the bribe
tj = τa and adversarial media outlets accept the bribe ti = τ(a+ ω).
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2. If If n > rβτω+τa , the media is independent – each media outlet reports the true type of the
incumbent.
Proof. See Appendix. !
The proposition says that, the more plural the media gets, the harder it becomes to silence
it. The plurality should be high relative to the ratio of rent enjoyed by the incumbent to the
cost of silencing one media outlet. Other things being equal, capture is more likely when
rents from office holding are high. When rents get larger, the amount that the incumbent may
offer as bribes also increases. The higher the total amount of audience related revenues in the
market, the harder the media capture. Other things being equal, as the media pie gets larger, it
becomes harder to silence the media outlets who share a bigger pie. Media capture also gets
higher when the proportion of adversarial media outlets in the media market increases. When
the benefits from the election of the opposition increases for the incumbent, the probability
of media capture also decreases.
In the equilibrium, it is not enough to bribe each adversarial outlet for their lost revenues
a
n + ω or to bribe each non-adversarial outlet for
a
n . In order to silence them, the incumbent
should pay the amount they would get if they were the only informative outlet. A lower
amount is not acceptable since the incumbent offers bribes only if it knows that everybody
will accept. Thus the total cost of suppressing all adversarial and non-adversarial outlets will
be n(βτω + τa). The incumbent compares this total amount to its potential benefit from
reelection, r.
Proposition 2 The incumbent should pay an extra amount of τω to each adversarial-media
outlet in order to silence them.
Proof. See Appendix. !
The bribe that the incumbent transfers to adversarial and non-adversarial media outlets
different. The adversarial media has an extra cost from the re-election of the incumbent. Ad-
versarial media outlets give up a potential benefit of ω, from the election of opposition, when
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they suppress the signal. The incumbent should compensate for this loss in order to con-
vince the adversarial media outlet for to suppress the information. The higher the adversarial
outlet’s benefit from the election of the opposition, the harder it is to silence the media.
3.4 Limitations
One major limitation of the model is that it rules out one major tool used by incumbent gov-
ernments to silence media: repression. In reality, repression might become the less costly
option when ideological bias of media increases cost of buying off media outlets. Beyond a
threshold level of ideological opposition in the media, the incumbent government may choose
to resort to repression instead of bribing. For the current study, we abstract away from this
potential complication and focus on cases where repression is never optimal. More specifi-
cally, the model assumes that the government does have effective repressing tools or the cost
of repression is too high. One legitimation for this strategy might be to assume that ideolog-
ical bias in the media is likely to be correlated with the ideological bias in the society 1 and
this ideological bias in society consequently increases cost of repression for a democratically
elected incumbent.
Another limitation of the model is the assumption that the viewers only prefer media out-
lets that deliver news. In reality, people tend to stick with biased media outlets that represent
their own ideological bias. Chan and Suen (2008) show that readers choose a media out-
let with similar ideological positions, they get more decision-relevant information from these
outlets. This, as a result, lead to polarization of opinions and emergence of self-serving beliefs
(Suen 2004).





Turkey has been attracting the attention of international community due to troubling issues
related to press freedom in the country. For instance, Freedom House Report reveals the
close relationships between the ruling AKP and various media outlets. The report asserts
that one major obstacle to press freedom in Turkey is the economic dependence of the media
outlets to state contracts (FreedomHouse 2014, IPI 2015). As FreedomHouse Report reveals,
in Turkey, holding companies with interests in the media sector benefit from government
contracts. For example Dogus Holding (owner of two television channels: NTV and Star
TV) won a $702 million bid in May 2013 to operate a port reconstruction project in Istanbul.
In November, Ihlas Holding (owner of newspaper Turkiye, Ihlas News Agency, and TGRT
TV) signed a deal that worth $1.86 billion to redevelop one of Istanbul’s neighborhoods. The
reports warn that manymainstream outlets are under government’s influence due to the similar
business ties.
In this environment, DoganMedia, one of the biggest mainstreammedia outlets of Turkey,
published a letter in 2014 addressing former prime minister and AKP leader, current president
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The letter was ended with the following sentence:
Mr. President,
If you mean that we are afraid of defending our right to freedom of the press,
free speech and freedom to criticize, which are all guaranteed by the constitution,
then you should know that we will defend these freedoms with no fear (Hurriyet
Daily News 2015).
Following the report, Dogan Group came under a heavy pressure of the incumbent party.
In the summer of 2015, government officials accused Dogan Group and its owner Aydin Do-
gan to be a supporter of Kurdish terrorist group PKK although they have no known connec-
tions to the terrorist organization. In September 2015, the headquarters of the media group
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was attacked by a pro-AKP group that includes the former head of AKP’s youth organiza-
tion and a current member of parliament from the ruling party. The angry group broke the
windows of the main building of the media outlet by throwing stones. Following the brutal
attack, the head of the media group, Vuslat Dogan Sabanci, gave a speech in front of the at-
tacked building. In her speech, she emphasized the media group’s stance against terrorism
by supporting the claim saying that the editor-in-chief of their newspaper once was killed by
the very same terrorist group. She also clearly stated in the speech that they will continue
their journalism correctly and objectively, by not giving any concession over their principles
(Hurriyet Daily News 2015a).
Just a few days after the report, It was claimed that the Dogan Group and its former fuel
retailing unit, Petrol Ofisi, would not be able to bid in state tenders, although this claim was
refuted by Dogan Group. Following this event, Petrol Ofisi managers, including Aydin Dogan
and his daughter Hanzade Dogan Boyner, are sued by the state in accusation of fuel smug-
gling for tax evasion. The claim is that Petrol Ofisi managers are suspected to be ’opposition
to anti-smuggling law,’ ’forgery of official documents,’ and ’founding an organization to
commit crime’ (Ulas 2016). Although Aydin Dogan has refuted accusation and rejected his
responsibility in the executive board of Petrol Ofisi using his news agency (DHA 2016), the
case is still under investigation.
Although calling Dogan Group of Turkey as a fully independent media outlet would be
a strong claim, it is clear that the group have been standing firm against the incumbent party
compared to the other mainstream media outlets. Considering almost all mainstream media
outlets, including Dogan Group, having business interests related to state contracts in Turkey,
Dogan Group’s adversary may be related to another factor. Dogan Group, as a representative
of centrist/secular values, is ideologically adversarial to the religious conservative incumbent
party.
Here, I need to mention that the stance of Dogan Group started to change after the Novem-
ber 2015 elections. Since November 2015 elections, where the AKP has won 49.5% of votes
and consolidated its power, Dogan Group has started to alter its news coverage dramatically
and has hired journalists who are known with their close relations to the top AKP cadres.
However, one may interpret this change that the ideological threshold of Dogan Group is
exceeded and this does not contradict the predictions of the model.
Going back to the discussion on the determinants of ideological stance of media outlets,
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DoganGroup’s adversarial stand can explained by both supply and demand-side stories. How-
ever, given the low levels of commercialization in the Turkish media market, a supply-side
explanation will matter more. 1 On the other hand, pure intrinsic political views of media
outlet owners cannot be explained with a profit-maximization assumption. The adversarial
stand of Dogan Group, therefore, can be explained by critical junctures. The hostility between
the media group and Turkish president starts in 2005 when Dogan Media publishes reports
regarding the corruption in the party financing of Justice and Development Party (AKP). AKP
replies back with a large tax fine (around $2 billion) to Dogan Group to punish the coverage
of corruption. Since then, the hostility remains vivid and causes a chilling effect on all other
media outlets. This chilling effect creates the dramatic difference between Dogan and Dogus
Groups (Personal interview 2015). The payoff for Dogan Media, therefore, depends on both
the profit-maximization and political views. In the model constructed in this paper, media
outlets receive payoff both from their ideological preferences and profits.
In addition to the mainstream media outlets of Dogan Group, there are a few alternative
media outlets in Turkey that stand against the governing AKP such as Cumhuriyet, Sozcu,
Halk TV and BirGun. All these outlets have their bases in strong ideologies and are well
known for their ideological stances. For instance, Sozcu is a representative of leftist national-
ist ideology which is harshly against the values AKP represents. Halk TV is owned by main
opposition party CHP. BirGun is known for its leftist orientation. However, I do not present
a detailed case of these outlets since they are alternative outlets with limited reach.
4.2 Peru
In 2000, 10-year Fujimori government fell in Peru due to the revealing of a large scale
corruption scandal. Channel N, an independent cable channel, was the main actor of this re-
veal. After reaching the data, Channel N had broadcasted videos of Montesinos while bribing
a politician. Although getting data on corruption is a difficult task, access to the evidence of
Peruvian corruption scandal was possible thanks to meticulous documentation of Vladimiro
Montesinos, Fujimori’s advisor and Intelligence Service Chief. AlthoughMontesinos himself
was the one who is offering bribes, he had audiotaped and/or videotaped 1600 dealings in or-
der to keep track of them, or to use them as a threat against anyone whomight turn against him
1Carkoglu and Yavuz (2010) show that partisan alignments of newspapers in Turkey are reflected in the party
preferences of their readers. However, supply side matter more because commercialization of media market is
at low levels.
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or against President Fujimori in case he attempts to fire Montesinos (MacMillan and Zoido
2004).
Fujimori government had bribed judges, politicians and media outlets. However cost of
bribingmedia outlets were by far higher than cost of bribing judges or politicians. AsMacMil-
lan and Zoido (2004) state, the total monthly bribe paid tomedia was around $3million dollars
whereas the amount paid to judges was around $250,000 per month. Bribes received by politi-
cians was also modest compared to bribes given to media: $300.000 per month. Channel 7
was not bribed since it was already state owned. Five other private television channels were
bought off: The largest one, Channel 4, received $1.5 million dollars per month for suppress-
ing their news coverage. Channels 2 and 5 were receiving $500,000 dollars each per month.
The other two channels, 9 and 13, had relatively smaller viewerships and received bribes in
the form of government purchases, deals and judicial favors. All other media outlets, includ-
ing mainstream ones such as Channel 4, accepted additional bribes in the form of business or
judicial favors, or high-ranked positions in state cadres (MacMillan and Zoido 2004).
Only one television channel resisted this system of bribes. Channel N consistently refused
bribes and continued to criticize Fujimori’s government during its term. Channel N was a
small cable channel with a market share of 8%. However, this outlet managed to brought
down the regime by igniting resistance in public by airing a video ofMontesinos while bribing
a politician. A newspaper owned by the same company, El Comercio, also refused bribes. El
Comercio was the oldest newspaper in Peru. In contrast to the small market share of Channel
N, it had the largest share in the newspaper market in 2001 (Djankov et al. 2003). Both outlets
were owned by the Miro Quesadas family. MacMillan and Zoido (2004) explain the situation
as follows:
Some newspapers like La Republica and El Comercio and some magazines like
Caretas courageously continued to criticize the government despite being ha-
rassed, reporting for example on abuses in the lead-up to the 2000 election. The
harassment ranged from libel suits to arbitrary detention to death threats. In an
attempt to discredit any journalists who dared investigate the government, the
tabloids carried hundreds of stories defaming them with bizarre labels: ”a men-
tal midget,” ”a she devil,” ”undercover terrorist,” ”paid coup provocateur.” A
headline in El Chino proclaimed three journalists ”the rabid animals of the anti-
Peruvian press.”
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How could Channel N survive as an independent TV channel? Why Fujimori and Mon-
tesinos had not bribed Channel N and El Comercio although they believed in the power of
media and reserved a huge budget to control media? MacMillan and Zoido (2004) argue that
Fujimori and Montesinos did not bribe Channel N because they underestimated it since it was
an expensive cable channel with only 8% of market share.
While the tabloids read by the majority of Peruvians were mostly under Mon-
tesinos’s control, it was the more educated and affluent Peruvians who read the
independent newspapers andmagazines. Montesinos seems to have decided these
outlets were not influential enough to be worth bribing. A video shows him say-
ing he was unconcerned. ’What do I care about El Comercio? They have an
80,000 print run. 80,000 newspapers is shit. What worries me is Channel 4... It
reaches 2 million people... La Republica can do whatever they want. What is a
20,000 print run?” Also, the owners of El Comercio may have placed so high a
value on their reputation as to be incorruptible. Unlike some of the other news
outlets, El Comercio was in sound financial health.
Their explanation for El Comercio’s independence is that newspaper was a less powerful
tool to mobilize people since newspapers had only limited number of readers.
If these arguments are sufficient, then how one could explain other small cable channels
that choose to cooperate with the government? How about those newspapers which choose to
print news controlled by the government. What is the reason that differentiates El Comercio
and Channel N from other cable channels and newspapers? MacMillan and Zoido’s argument
is not sufficient to explain what is special about Channel N and El Comercio. If the explana-
tion is financial health, we already know that Fujimori government paid large amounts only
to the mainstream TV channels, not to cable networks or newspapers.
Moreover, financial health or limited reach explanations are not sufficient to understand
motivation to resist harassments.
”Not all of Peru’s media fell victim to official scheming. Independent outlets
- the newspapers El Comercio and La Republica, the magazine Caretas, Cadena
Peruana de Noticias radio, and cable news network Canal N were at the forefront
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in the struggle against the regime, and their reporters were often targets of gov-
ernment harassment. Fujimori’s attempts to intimidate the press earned him a
place in the Committee to Protect Journalists ”Top Ten Enemies of the Press” list
in 1999 and 2000 and landed Peru in the Freedom Forum’s category of having
”no free press” at the same time.” (Conaghan 2002)
The owners and workers of these outlets were harassed by the Fujimori government. Fu-
jimori regime arrested journalists, used death threats, and employed torture. Therefore, ex-
plaining the stance against Fujimori regime with the scope of these outlets’ reach or financial
situation is not sufficient.
Another explanation regarding the existence of independent media outlets is that these
outlets were consisting of print press while Montesinos and Fujimori had managed to control
almost the whole mainstream non-cable television and tabloid press (MacMillan and Zoido
2004, Conaghan 2002). Conaghan describes the situation as follows:
By exploiting the financial and legal headaches of firms and appealing to the
avarice of executives, Montesinos pieced together an integrated communications
apparatus for the 2000 election. All the wheeling and dealing gave the govern-
ment a near monopoly of influence over the most important medium in Peru, non-
cable television, and almost complete control over the popular tabloid press. In
erecting this clandestine network, Montesinos radically shrunk the public space
available to the opposition, confining most of its criticisms to the pages of the
print press, some radio stations, and the lone independent cable channel Canal N.
However, El Comercio was the newspaper with the largest share in the newspaper market.
With its 16% market share it was sold more than the most popular tabloid press (Djankov et
al. 2008). If the answer is popularity, the explanation is not sufficient when the most popular
newspaper was El Comercio at the time.
The gap in the literature in explaining the existence of independent media in Peru can be
filled by the role ideology plays. A further investigation in Peruvian politics may reveal that
a previous exogenous ideological diversion between Fujimori government and El Comercio




Besley and Prat (2006) study the political economy of media capture. Their model dis-
cusses how and when government captures media. The model reveals that independence of
media can be ensured when the number of privately owned media outlets and the commercial-
ization in the media market increase. Nevertheless, they do not allow for the role of ideology.
In their model, media outlets are homogenous and do not have any ideological attributes. The
main contribution of this paper is examining the role of ideology in media capture. The model
produces predictions about the proportion of the adversarial media outlets in the market and
the effects of their levels of contrariety.
As Besley and Prat (2006) demonstrate, an increase in the number of independent media
outlets, an increase in the transaction costs through introducing additional regulations over the
media-incumbent relations, and by increasing the commercialization of the media industry,
the media capture becomes more difficult for incumbent. This paper adds to the analysis that
an increase in the proportion of ideologically adverse media outlets and an increase in their
levels of their opposition make media capture harder.
Following the implications of the model, one might ask what factors may protect media
outlets who oppose incumbent ideologically. Popularly elected incumbents of new democra-
cies establish close relationships with media bosses. Media outlets owned by holdings with
diverse business interests receive privileges in government contracts or benefit from legisla-
tions that favor their business interests. Media outlets depend on these transfers tend to remain
in the media market. A theoretical and a practical interest here is understanding the ways that
facilitate the survival of adversarial media outlets.
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium strategies and believes are:
(i) Voters believe Pr(θ = g) = 0 if s = b and Pr(θ = g) = γ if s = ∅
(ii) Voters re-elect the incumbent if s = ∅ and they elect the opposition if s = b.
(iii) outlet i accepts ti if and only if ti ≥ τ(a+ω), outlet j accepts tj if and only if tj ≥ τa.
(iv) The incumbent offers ti = τ(a+ω) to each adversarial outlet and tj = τa to each non-
adversarial outlet if: (a) all outlets have observed s=b; (b) nβτω+nτa ≤ r. Otherwise,
the incumbent offers 0 to all outlets.
In order to prove that this is the unique pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
voters do not play weakly dominated strategies (PSPBEW), we begin with voter behavior.
If s = b, voting for the opposition is a strictly dominant strategy. There is not a pure
strategy equilibrium within which the voters elected the opposition when s = ∅. Because in
such case the incumbent would not suppress the information and the posterior belief when the
voters observe s = ∅ would be that the incumbent is good. Therefore, they would definetely
re-elect the incumbent. Thus, in every PSPBEW the incumbent is re-elected if and only if
s = ∅.
Considering the interaction between the incumbent and the outlet, we show that in every
PSPBEW an informed adversarial outlet accepts a bribe which is greater than a + ω and
an informed non-adversarial outlet accepts a bribe which is greater than a. The transfer to
adversarial outlet should compensate for the total amount of audience-related revenues in the
market and for the potential benefit from the election of opposition. Suppose that there exists
an equilibrium in which j accepts an offer strictly below a. In this equilibrium, all outlets
are silenced. But, if j rejects the offer, it is the only outlet who delivers informative news.
Therefore he gets a: a contradiction. Similarly, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in
which i accepts an offer strictly below a+ω. In this equilibrium, all outlets are silenced. But,
if i rejects the offer, it is the only outlet who delivers informative news. Voters are informed
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about the true type of the incumbent and the opposition is elected. Therefore i gets a + ω: a
contradiction.
This means that in every PSPBEW, the incumbent chooses to bribe and silence media if r
is greater than nβτω + nτa ≤ r, otherwise it does not offer a bribe and lets them signal the
incumbent’s type.
We thus showed that in every PSPBEW, players behave as in the equilibrium discussed in
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We have shown in the Proof of Proposition 1 that the incumbent has to give a + ω to every
adversarial outlet, whereas it has to give a to each non-adversarial outlet. However the media
outlets will receive a bribe which is divided by the transaction cost. Therefore the cost of
adversarial bribe for the incumbent will be τ(a+ω)whereas the cost of non-adversarial bribe
will be τa. Thus;
ti − tj = τ(a+ ω)− τa
ti − tj = τa+ τω − τa
ti − tj = τω
The incumbent should offer a higher bribe to adversarial media outlets.
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